Role of Elections
Democracy depends on everyone, especially the losers, accepting the results of elections.
"The people have spoken . . . the bastards!" -Dick Tuck concession speech Transparency It is not enough for elections to be accurate.
We have to know that they are accurate.
All critical aspects of the process must be -publicly observable, or -independently checkable (Preferably both) Transparency With Paper Ballots
Paper ballots are compatible with transparent processes.
-Voter makes a permanent record of vote.
-Locked ballot box is in public view.
-Transportation and counting of ballots are observed by political parties and election officials.
Everyone understands paper.
Any new system should be at least this trustworthy.
Levels of Accountability
We often have to trust people, but we rarely trust them without accountability.
Levels of accountability
-Can we detect error? -Can we correct it?
Simple error detection is the most condition for trustworthiness.
Trust "You have to trust somebody."
We only need to trust groups of people with diverse interests (e.g., observers from different political parties). • Crimes are easier for insiders (e.g., embezzling).
Outline

Voting is Especially Hard
Unlike almost every other secure system, voting must discard vital information:
the connection between the voter and the vote.
Comparison with banking
Electronic audit records have names of everyone involved in every transaction. Banks usually have paper backup! . . . And computer crime still occurs -especially by insiders. but • Fraud can be quantified (we can tell when it happens). • Customers are protected.
"We've never had a proven case of vote fraud on DREs"
• Votes have definitely been lost due to bugs (Wake County, NC, 2002). • Fraud has never been investigated. • Candidates don't bother asking for recounts They just get "reprints"
• Danger and motivation increases with number of DREs (twice as many votes this election than 2002). • Applications with much more security and lower stakes have had sophisticated fraud (e.g., gambling).
What software are we running?
We cannot verify that desired software is running on a computer. • Stringent software design/review (even formal verification) doesn't solve the problem. • Open source does not solve the problem. This closes the auditing gap.
VVAT is not enough
Closing the audit gap is necessary but not sufficient.
Additional conditions:
-Physical security of ballots through final count must be maintained. -Process must be transparent (observers with diverse interests must be permitted at all points).
There are many other requirements, e.g., accessibility.
Manual Recounts
Computer counts cannot be trusted. 
